Death Before the Fall

Lions hunting

Over on Jesus Creed, RJS asks about death before the Fall. Following Ronald Osborn, she suggests that the place of death within the creation is a problem, especially for those who take Genesis literally. As death is supposed to arise from the curse, she suggests three ways in which we might choose to reconcile the text with the reality that we observe:

Possibility One. After the sin of Adam, God gave over the animal kingdom to natural predation.
Possibility Two. God cursed or dramatically modified the animal kingdom after Adam’s Fall.
Possibility Three. Predatory animals are a result of demonic forces at work in the world.

I haven’t yet read Osborn, but the following are a few thoughts on a fourth possibility. I believe that this possibility is suggested by reflection upon the text of Genesis itself, rather than being a highly speculative theory to fill a crucial gap in the biblical account.

The fourth possibility begins by challenging the premise that there was no animal death before the Fall (along with the assumption that human beings were naturally immortal). The claim that there was no animal death before the Fall is not one that the text itself gives us, but arises out of the conviction that animal death is characteristic of the futility and bondage of corruption to which creation was subjected following the Fall of Adam. For this fourth approach, death is associated with the state of innocence, immaturity, wildness, and being unperfected.

How might we develop such a reading from the text itself?

The world was never created ‘perfect’, but was created ‘good’. In Genesis 1:2, the entire creation was formless, void, and untamed. In Genesis 2:5, this situation is recapitulated on a smaller scale. God begins to address this situation by creating a man. Then, after creating the man, he creates the Garden and places the man within it. It is not unreasonable to assume that the man would have witnessed both the unformed, void, and untamed creation and then God’s planting of the Garden within it.

The Garden is the divine sanctuary, the place where God walks in the midst of mankind, and the template for the solution to the problem of the wider world. The Garden is walled or hedged and there is limited access to it, enabling those within it to defend it against intrusion (cf. Genesis 3:24). In creating the Garden, God establishes boundaries within the land, preventing unauthorized access and dividing one zone from others. The act of creating the Garden is one of forming and filling, much like that of Genesis 1. The Garden is walled off from the untamed creation that surrounds it and then it is filled with trees and with beauty. Within the Garden itself there are further boundaries established. The Tree of Life and the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil were placed in the heart of the Garden. These trees don’t only organize space—identifying the centre of the Garden—but also create a world with new ethical boundaries.

James Jordan suggests a set of parallels between the events of the creation days of Genesis 1 and the establishment of the Garden in Genesis 2, following the formless, void, and untamed situation of Genesis 2:5. The first day, the day when God created light, corresponds to the creation of man in his image, the human light of the world. The second day, when God created the firmament division between heaven and earth, corresponds to the division of the heaven-model of the Garden from the general formless void of the rest of the earth. The third day, the separation of dry land from the waters and the creation of grasses, herbs, and fruit trees, corresponds to the creation of the trees of the Garden and the river that flows out from Eden to water the Garden and to divide the earth into its respective lands.

The fourth day, the placing of lights in the firmament of the heavens, corresponds to the placing of the human light, Adam, in the firmament of the Garden as its ruler and priest. Jordan connects the fifth day, the creation of creatures to fly across the face of the firmament above and to teem in the waters beneath, with the blessing and judgment associated with the trees. I am more inclined to join together days five and six (the day of the creation of land creatures and humanity) and relate it to God’s formation of the birds and the animals and his bringing them to Adam to name. Just as the sixth day of the creation of Genesis 1 culminates in the creation of humanity, so the bringing of the animals to Adam to name culminates with God’s formation of a new human from his side, who is brought to him to name. The union of man and woman in the Garden that follows corresponds to the seventh day, the day of rest. In this manner, the larger order of the creation is recapitulated in microcosm in the creation of the world of the Garden, not merely in structural order, but also in its temporal sequence.

The man is placed within the Garden as the priest. As the priest, he is charged with the task of guarding and serving the enclosed sanctuary in the midst of which God walks. He is also given the law concerning the holy food, a law that he will be expected to treat his wife when she is created, and to their children after them. The priest is the one who maintains the ‘tamed’ and ‘domestic’ character of the Garden and the one who upholds, defends, and enforces its boundaries.

As the man upholds the order of the Garden, it will provide a model that he will bring out into the world and a temple into which he will bring in the riches of the world (we should note the references to precious stones and metals in the description of the lands surrounding Eden). He must make the world into a Garden and the Garden into a glorious garden city, clothed with all of the riches of the world, much like the city that we see in Revelation. He learns within and from the order of God’s own creative work, so that he can engage in creative work of his own as God’s image.

The world is unlike the Garden and doesn’t yet have any gardener working within it. It is formless, void, and untamed, and the beasts that dwell within it are also untamed. It remains to be subdued by a gardener and a tamer of wild beasts. God brought the animals to the man for him to name. Just as God had planted the Garden after the man’s creation, providing the man with a model for his own work within the world, the bringing of the animals to the man also served to acquaint him with the nature of his task. As God brought the great wild animals to the man to name, the man was like a son learning from his Father’s example. Just as his Father tamed the wild beasts—even the Leviathan and Behemoth—so he was to exercise God’s rule over them. The Garden is to be glorified as God’s ‘domus’ and the wild creation must be ‘domesticated’, as man shepherds God’s good yet untamed creation. The fulfilment of man’s rule is seen when the lion is made to lie down with the lamb, house-trained creatures in the temple of the Lord.

To fill out this picture, we must recognize that the original creation was good, yet imperfect. It is a world in its infancy. Adam and Eve are naked like infants in a kindergarten, under the training of angels, not yet clothed with glory and honour as rulers over the whole creation. God protects them from the wildness of the wider world within the walls of the Garden. The task within the world still remains to be done: they have yet to be fruitful, multiply, fill the world, and subdue it. Perfection was not the creation’s natural state, but its intended destiny (and salvation is not a ‘rebooting’ of creation to its primary state, but the restoring of creation to the future that God originally intended for it).

Death is related to immaturity in various ways. I have already mentioned the issue of being untamed. Death is also an engine of growth. It clears away the old to make way for the new. Without death the world could easily become stagnant. No wind would blow away the stale air of an older generation’s prevailing ideologies. The world would be a place of exhausted possibilities, with little space within which a novel departure could occur.

‘Death’ can be part of the means by which new life comes, as we die to an old form of existence and are raised up to another more glorious form (‘unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies…’). 1 Corinthians 15:35-49 would suggest that Adam’s original physicality was immature too, that it was always destined to become a glorious spiritually empowered mode of bodily existence, and that a ‘good death’ was an essential mechanism by which this would take place. As Christ bears the alienation of ‘bad death’, we are able to view death as a good thing, as that which delivers us from our old failing Adamic bodies in preparation for being clothed with a much more glorious physicality.

The immature world is also a world of inchoate ethics. Innocence is not an ideal moral state, but is characterized by moral naivety and a lack of knowledge of good and evil. The innocence of the newborn is its incapacity for moral action, either good or evil. The infant cannot morally ‘fall’, because it cannot yet ‘walk’. Animals can’t sin in the same way as human beings not because they are perfect, but because they do not possess our moral capacity. An immature world is one with limited capacity for moral responsibility with respect to life. As various people have observed, the violent criminal is just a two year old who never learned how to stop functioning as a two year old. On a related front, human sinlessness before the Fall shouldn’t be considered in terms of moral perfection according to the Ten Commandments, for instance. The commandment concerning the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil assumed only a very limited moral capacity of those receiving it (also, biblical evidence strongly suggests that Adam and Eve would have been given to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil when they had matured). The sinlessness of Christ is a radically different thing from the sinlessness of the pre-Fall Adam.

As infants don’t yet know good from evil, they must be directed to the good by external command, which is how God trained Adam and Eve. It is also why they were capable of falling. However, with maturity, we are more internally oriented to the good and ethics starts to function according to different principles (wisdom, persuasion, etc.). With perfection, our wills will be so capable of apprehending our good that we will no longer be capable of willing to do evil, not by virtue of some external compulsion, but by virtue of mature wills and natures and their appropriate mutual correspondence.

How does the judgment upon Adam following the Fall play into this picture?

First, after the Fall, in the task of taming, ordering, and mastering the creation, Adam would find that the creation would be far more powerfully resistant to his efforts. He would try to make the creation into a garden and the creation would fight back with thorns and thistles. He would have to engage in the task given to him with bitterness and pain. The beasts that he needed to tame might even take his life. He wouldn’t have the power to hold the creation in check and the violence of the natural order would increase (Genesis 9:1-7 is a significant development, as it gives men greater power relative to the wild animals).

Second, by expelling man from the Garden, God removed mankind from the protection of its walls and hedges. Cast out from the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve would have to operate in the wild, in an untamed and hostile world. Much as God removed the ‘hedge’ surrounding Job and protecting him from the assaults of Satan and his enemies (cf. Job 1:10), so God made Adam and Eve vulnerable to being harmed or attacked by wild beasts, natural forces, Satan, sin, and later human violence.

Third, picking up on the third possibility identified in RJS’s post and related to the previous point, there are suggestions in Scripture that demonic forces can exercise a measure of power within the created world and over its forces (not least in the instance of the serpent in the Garden). By lifting the hedge of protection from Adam and Eve, God gave Satan and his forces a longer leash with which to attack them. The serpent was to eat dust, but Adam was reminded that he was dust and that he would return to it: prey of the serpent. As his children rejected him, God would not protect them in from the hostile forces within the creation to the same extent.

Fourth, by expelling Adam and Eve from the Garden, they were denied access to the holy food of the Tree of Life and to the transfiguring presence of God. Cut off from the source of their life, they would wither, as they had no source of life in themselves. Cut off from God’s vivifying presence, we gravitate to the grave, physically as well as spiritually.

I submit that the proposal outlined above is a much richer, more biblical, and a considerably more satisfying way of understanding the role of death within the original creation as described by Genesis. In addition to its value in understanding Genesis, it also provides us with a number of key insights that help us better to understand the work and person of Christ.

First, Christ’s obedience is not about ‘innocence’ but about ‘perfection’. Christ brings humanity to the height and fullness of its divinely intended moral stature. He gives us, not merely innocence or obedience, but full maturity.

Second, humanity was always intended to die and rise again to a more glorious form of life. Christ death and resurrection achieves this destiny.

Third, as the last Adam, Christ will pacify and tame the entire creation, ruling until every enemy is placed under his feet.

Fourth, as we are in Christ, the bad character of death is minimized. We are not unclothed to be left naked, but in order to be more fully clothed, to have death swallowed up in life. We are still subject to the hostile attacks of the world and to the possibility of death within it, but Christ is the Tree of Life and we have unrestricted access to him. Death is no longer the alienating power that it once was.

Posted in Bible, Creation, Ethics, Genesis, OT, The Blogosphere, Theological | 88 Comments

Open Mic Thread 1

Mic

At the suggestion of ‘The Man Who Was…’, a frequent commenter in these parts, I am going to start a new series of posts. Every couple of weeks, I will publish a post like this, without a specific topic. The comments of this post will be thrown open to you, the readers of this blog, to:

  • Discuss things that you have been reading/listening to/watching recently
  • Share interesting links
  • Ask questions
  • Put forward a position for more general discussion
  • Tell us about yourself and your interests
  • Publicize your blog, book, conference, etc.
  • Draw our intention to worthy thinkers, charities, ministries, books, and events
  • Post reviews
  • Suggest topics for future posts
  • Use as a bulletin board
  • Etc.

It is up to you to make of these posts what you want. If they catch on, they will be an ongoing fixture here. Over to you!

Posted in Open Mic, Public Service Announcement | 104 Comments

Jesus Before Pilate

While on the subject of guest posts, here are two other pieces that I wrote over the last couple of weeks. Both are reflections upon political themes present within Jesus’ appearance before Pontius Pilate as recorded in the gospel of John.

The Politics of a Misunderstood Kingdom—John 18:28-38


The Politics of the Mob—John 19:1-16a

You can see other guest posts that I have written here.

Posted in Bible, Holy Week, John, NT, NT Theology, Theological | 2 Comments

A Conversation on Lent, Individualism, and Christian Piety

Lent

My friend Jake Meador and I had a wide-ranging e-mail conversation over the last few days. It was posted on Mere Orthodoxy earlier today. It is lengthy, but worth checking out. The following are a few quotations from our discussion to whet your appetite.

[M]ost of us haven’t taken the time to adequately understand the role that Lent plays within Catholic or Orthodox piety, nor have we stopped to ask whether a similar role even exists in evangelical piety. I think Lent is far less problematic for evangelicals than, say, praying to saints. But unless we try to understand the particular thing Lent accomplishes in the piety of other traditions we run the risk of sloppily importing a practice into evangelical piety that actually doesn’t work in evangelical piety–and may even undermine it.

***

Part of the genius of Lent historically was the manner in which it knit together personal and communal formation, overcoming the individual-corporate polarity that is so often present in our thinking. It expressed the intimate connection between the preparation of individual baptismal candidates and the more general preparation of the whole church body for the celebration of Easter.

***

As Mark Searle observed, ‘We seek community as a means of self-fulfillment, looking to it to meet our needs but reluctant to submit ourselves to its constraints, we merely succeed in turning our parish liturgies into “life-style enclaves,” as Bellah calls them, the coming-together of people who enjoy the same things.’ Few are truly aware of the degree to which, even when faithfully going through the motions of traditional liturgy, prevailing forms of subjectivity lead us to perform them against their grain, leaving us untouched by their true formative power. Beyond the recovery of traditional liturgy, we need consciously to reflect upon how we might re-establish the sorts of subjectivity that ought to correspond to them. This is a matter to which much less serious thought has been devoted. How can we move beyond what Searle terms ‘shared celebrations’ to genuinely public and common worship?

***

Even the things that we think of as creating an experience of being compelled are actually still under our control to a large degree–I might hate my job and hate the things my boss makes me do, but I can always apply for other jobs. The normal experience of my life is that I possess a tremendous amount of control over my circumstances–and that is seen as an unambiguous good by most in the contemporary west today. And obviously a lot of good things have come from greater personal liberty. But these personal liberties often have the effect of isolating us from our neighbors–which is why we’re seeing so much chatter amongst certain traditionalist conservatives about Burke’s “little platoons.” Some of us are starting to realize that the kind of autonomous freedom we aspire to brings with it a heavy price.

***

The ashtagging phenomenon that I mentioned earlier is one example of a use of social media that comes fairly naturally to us within the current ecology of the Internet, but which may reveal distortions in the modes of our engagement. As a ‘viral’ Internet ‘meme’, ashtagging works by means of imitation. The power of the meme to bring people together is profound: when we participate in a meme we feel as though we are ‘part of something’, something bigger than ourselves that unites us with others. This sort of ‘viral’ imitation is a mode of community that is very powerful and effective in contexts where people are fairly undifferentiated and where emotions can pass rapidly from person to person without much to hinder them.

***

Perhaps the thing that first piqued my interest in the ashtagging trend was its use of ‘selfies’. Žižek has used the concept of ‘interpassivity’ to discuss such things as canned laughter on television. The canned laughter substitutes for my own laughter, laughing for me, and saving me from having to do so for myself (for those who can’t relate to this, just think of the ways that you use emoticons and Internet abbreviations to substitute for actual displays of emotion). The selfie can often perform a similar purpose. The selfie—which typically exists to be posted online—is part of an image of myself that I construct in and for an online community, such as Facebook. This online image of me can start to substitute for me, virtually performing my identity so that I don’t really have to. I haven’t truly had a wonderful holiday unless I have an incredible photo album for my friends to ‘like’ on Facebook. In fact, while on holiday much of my attention may be diverted from the immediate enjoyment of it to the construction of an image of the holiday to stand for this enjoyment. This online image—or perhaps idol—of the self can even become integral to my identity, becoming the means by which we know ourselves. We all risk functioning like mini-celebrities now.

Anyway, there is much, much more there. Do take a look and leave your thoughts in the comments!

Posted in Church History, Culture, Guest Post, Lent, The Church, Theological, Worship | 2 Comments

On the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in England and Wales

Today has witnessed the first legal same-sex marriages within England and Wales. This development heralds the movement into a new stage of public discourse surrounding marriage, within which a different set of issues will become more prominent and pressing. The following are some thoughts at the current juncture in the cultural conversation.

1. Irrespective of its legality, same-sex marriage still isn’t marriage.

In challenging same-sex marriage, our argument has not been that it shouldn’t be permitted, but that it isn’t possible. Calling the union between two persons of the same sex a ‘marriage’ doesn’t make it one, even if that definition is made legally binding. Marriage names the committed sexual union between a man and a woman. By recognizing and naming its unique character and significance, it protects and celebrates the natural relation that brings the sexes together, within which new life is brought into existence, and by which humanity is constituted as a race. This natural relation is the source of our deepest given bonds and integral to the well-being of society, providing a horizon of our existence and relations that precedes and transcends law, politics, technology, and economics, disclosing the primary telos of our sexed bodies and the deep natural grammar whereby we exist through, by, and with others. While Christians recognize a deeper set of issues that are at stake here (about which more soon), recognizing and upholding the natural reality at the heart of marriage and resisting the pressure to present it as being on a par with other forms of sexual relations is a matter of importance for society and its members more generally.

2. We’ve lost a big battle, but the war is far from over.

The legalization of same-sex marriage is a big step in the direction of the normalization of such relations and a significant milestone in our culture’s forgetting of the meaning of marriage. Nevertheless, the currency that same-sex marriages will have in our society is not singlehandedly determined by their being enshrined in law. It is far from assured that placing same-sex unions on a par with relations between the sexes in law will lead to the same equivalence being maintained in the minds and imaginations of the public. While same-sex marriages are now legal, we should seek to ensure that the public continues to regard such marriages as if in scare quotes or with an asterisk attached. The public may want to tolerate such unions, but that does not mean that they are on board with all for which they stand. As marriage culture deteriorates in our society more generally it may well be the case that the preservation of a robust definition and practice of marriage within the Church will lead people to recognize how chipped the coin of marriage is in the society more generally and not give it the currency that it claims for itself. Here the ‘quadruple lock’ may prove very significant.

3. The legalization of same-sex marriage further pushes open the door on other cultural struggles.

When society holds homosexual relations on a par with those between a man and a woman, it compromises its well-being on various fronts. Perhaps some of the most immediate effects are seen in the gradual diminishment of the significance of and weakening of the protections for the natural bonds between a child and their mother and father. The rights of children to their natural mother and father or to a mother and father more generally are compromised as same-sex marriage leads to a normalization of circumventions of procreative relations in favour of the use of reproductive technologies, economic transactions, or legal arrangements. With the legalization and normalization of same-sex marriage, it will be increasingly difficult to speak publicly of having a mother and father as natural, ideal, and normal, or to speak of the bond between children and their parents in terms of natural procreation. The normalization of same-sex unions will also encourage a decay of any public discourse concerning what is ‘natural’ in the sphere of human relations—between children and parents, between the sexes, or within wider family networks—and the elevation of social and legal constructivism over all else in this area.

4. The legalization of same-sex marriage gives momentum to other challenges to marriage.

Now that the big wave of same-sex marriage has broken down our cultural defences, successive waves will find fewer obstacles to their ingress. One of the developments that we should expect over the next decade are a push towards the normalization of non-monogamy, ‘monogamish’, or ‘open’ marriages. A number of the gays and lesbians who have been interviewed or have written on the subject of the legalization of same-sex marriage in the UK over the last few weeks have pointed out that gays and lesbians will retailor the institution for their own needs and preferences. Some have even used the language of ‘redefinition’. The sexual exclusivity of marriage is one thing that will be steadily challenged, weakened, or abandoned over the coming years. A further possible development is a rise in advocacy for the legalization of polyamorous relations.

5. This has the benefit of clarifying where we stand.

The legalization of same-sex marriage is a signal development within what has for the most part been a slow and gradual erosion of the institution of marriage. The foundations of the institution of marriage have been crumbling for decades. However, now that one of the walls of the institution has dramatically fallen away, there is a greater chance of making people aware of what is taking place. We would be deeply mistaken to see same-sex marriage as a development unrelated to previous developments in marriage more general. It is the cultural decay of the meaning of marriage between men and women and marriage culture more generally that has led quite directly to our current situation. For Christians, this development also clarifies where we stand with respect to our wider society and government. Christian values, which were formerly honoured and protected now seem to be in jeopardy and protection for Christian conscience, teaching, and practice are matters of growing concern. Our full participation in the public square and the right to air and uphold historic Christian convictions in education and elsewhere are increasingly uncertain. The expression of many Christian convictions is in danger of being consigned to private reservations and excluded from the broader realm of political, economic, cultural, and civil life. Christians who uphold and express orthodox views on sexual ethics risk marginalization, stigmatization, discrimination, or cultural exclusion. All of this will help Christians to process the fact that we are no longer a Christian country and will have the benefit of teaching us to act and think accordingly. While it has been important to address these issues publicly and politically, our primary concern should be that of creating a distinct culture within the Church, one which exposes the failures in the wider society.

6. As the primary context for our marriage apologetics shifts, we have the advantage of appealing more frequently and explicitly to some of our deepest, distinctively Christian, convictions about marriage.

In the more general cultural and political debate around marriage, in defending marriage we had to limit ourselves to secular categories and principles. While such defences are quite possible and still necessary—Christianity does not have any monopoly upon natural marriage—as the contrast between orthodox Christian understandings of marriage and those of the culture becomes sharper, we will spend more time defending marriage on our home turf. Here we have many more resources and arguments to call upon in its defence. We can make clear, for instance, that same-sex relations are an idolatrous distortion of the image of God—an offence directly against God and against human nature. We can also ground our defence of marriage upon the robust account of nature and teleology that exists within Christian orthodoxy.

7. Many of us will face a raft of new problems of conscience, tensions in our relationships, and difficulties in our workplaces.

Now that same-sex marriage has been legalized, those of us who still believe that such unions are not marriages will face pressures upon our convictions from various angles, personal, relational, legal, social, and political. Some of us will be invited to the gay weddings of friends or family. We will face the challenge of being seen to be rude and intolerant in standing for our convictions. We may risk losing or hurting friends or being socially ostracized. Others of us may be in forms of work that will require us tacitly or openly to approve of such unions with our actions or words, to facilitate the formation of such unions, or to act in terms of their legitimacy. We will need a great deal of grace, nerve, and wisdom in the coming years as these issues are ever more likely to hit closer to home.

8. We need to maintain a resolute and vocal witness on this matter.

We can reasonably regard the first legal same-sex marriages as nails in the coffin of the public debate on this matter. For many Christians who have opposed same-sex marriage, the closing of the public debate will lead to a change in their stance on the issue. Instead of openly speaking out on the matter, they will quietly resist or disapprove of it, regarding it as a lost cause. However, as in the case of abortion, even if there is no change of changing law or government policy, we need to bear a firm and uncompromising witness. Our witness to marriage and Christian sexual ethics are not merely apologetic in character, depending upon a public hearing for their rationale, but are essential dimensions of our Christian identity and testimony within a society. We aren’t merely in a position where we ‘can’t approve of’ same-sex marriage, but in one in which we must actively disapprove of them and have the responsibility to declare this fact as part of our Christian witness. This isn’t going to get any easier.

9. Grace is essential.

Holding a Christian position on same-sex marriage is increasingly going to put us in the position of being regarded as hateful, intolerant, uncivil, and disrespectful. Being in such a position is profoundly uncomfortable for many of us, especially as we instinctively desire to make clear our unconditional love for our gay and lesbian neighbours, friends, and family members. When our Christian witness will lead to our motives being maligned, aspersions being cast on our characters, and being represented as hating people for whom we care about deeply, it can be painful and difficult to maintain it. We must pray for wisdom and opportunity to express such concern, care, and love in such a manner that the true nature of and motives driving our resistance to same-sex marriage will be apparent. Sadly, for other Christians a different struggle will exist. For such Christians, the legalization of same-sex marriage will excite anger, hate, and bitterness towards gays and lesbians who are perceived to be vicious opponents of Christians. We must make clear the sinful character of such passions, wherever they might take root in our hearts. The Christian response to our gay and lesbian friends and neighbours should never be characterized by bitterness, spitefulness, or vengefulness, but must be expressed in a love addressed to them as they are—not to what we might want them to be—and a general pattern of behaviour towards them characterized by respectfulness, grace, and compassion.

10. This is a time for repentance.

In light of this latest development, we should recognize our own complicity within it. We should recognize how our failure to bear strong witness to the decay of marriage paved the way for this. We should recognize how Christians’ hatred and their use of God’s truth to justify and underwrite their hatred—and the way that many of us, while not following along, stood silently by while this was taking place—have given ammunition to those who dismiss the orthodox Christian position as a mere cloak for homophobia. We should recognize how professing Christians have contributed to the oppression of LGBT persons within our society in a manner that left our society and the Church without the moral credibility to withstand the unreasonable demands of the gay rights movement. Rather than just lamenting the state of our nation, let’s take this opportunity to lament the shameful role that we have played in its creation and seek both for God’s forgiveness and that of our neighbour.

I would be interested to hear your thoughts in the comments.

I have written lengthier treatments of the subject of same-sex marriage in various places in the past. The following are the main examples:

The Institution of Marriage, Same-Sex Unions, and Procreation
Questions and Answers on Same-Sex Marriage
The Case Against Same-Sex Marriage—Part 1, Part 2, Part 3

Posted in Controversies, Culture, Ethics, In the News, Sex and Sexuality, Theological | 65 Comments

Thoughts on the World Vision Debate

World Vision

The following are various thoughts on the recent World View USA brouhaha. The bitter disagreements that have been played out over the last few days have, with a few exceptions, followed familiar and predictable patterns, with the various antagonists performing well-rehearsed parts.

I presume that most of my readers are already aware of the basic facts of the story. The American branch of the Christian charity World Vision announced its decision to change its employee conduct policy, which formerly restricted sexual relations to marriage between a man and a woman, to include Christians in same-sex marriages. Two days later, following a lot of anger, hurt, protest, and outrage at the original decision, the decision was reversed. Over the course of the last few days, existing divisions in evangelical circles have become even more polarized and World Vision USA has alienated or annoyed Christians across the spectrum on the issue of same-sex marriage.

In making the original decision, World Vision USA made clear that they were not thereby intending to take a stand on the issue of same-sex marriage. Rather, they were seeking to conform their employee conduct policy to their broader stance on controversial issues between denominations and churches, taking a neutral stance and deferring to the authority of local churches.

I have been appalled by so many of the uncharitable and vicious responses to these developments on various sides of this debate. I doubt that I am alone in thinking that it represents a new nadir in intramural evangelical discourse. I have written at considerable length in the past about the unhealthy dynamics of much evangelical discourse online, especially within the context of social media. The responses to the changes to World Vision’s policy on both sides of the evangelical aisle have confirmed me in my conviction that we need to give careful thought to the way that we respond to issues and to each other and that we develop processes to encourage healthy discourse and defence mechanisms against the contagion of reactive and hateful outrage.

Among the many unhelpful responses that I have read, there have been a few perceptive and balanced treatments of the issues. It was not a surprise to me that Matt Anderson had some measured thoughts on the original decision in a post over on Mere Orthodoxy and some broader and insightful reflections on the story after World Vision reversed its original decision on Twitter (Matt has brought his tweets together here). Ian Paul also has written a helpful post on the matter here.

The last few days have raised or revived a number of key points, issues, or questions for me. I thought that I would list them and leave others to thrash them out in the comments or elsewhere.

1. Social Media and Evangelical Discourse

Disputes among evangelicals very consistently overheat, and most particularly on social media. We need to give close thought to why this is the case, why social media tends to bring out the worst in us, and the measures that we can take to protect ourselves from these dangerous dynamics. Evangelicals have often been insufficiently cautious and wary in their use of social media. Despite their many notable advantages, they have deleterious effects upon our conversations, not least on account of their false urgency and the other means by which they privilege emotional reactivity over consideration and reflection in response. The reactivity on all sides over the last few days is not a new phenomenon. It has happened before and it will happen again. We need to understand how and why it happens and what we can do to resist or prevent it.

2. Leadership

The outrage firestorms that often whip through the world of Christian social media, destroying or harming many relationships and ministries, primarily have to do with a failure of leadership. Seeing the responses of leading voices on both sides over the last few days, I have been dismayed by how many of our leaders manifest a failure to control their reactions and their words. When leaders are reactive, hasty, and intemperate in their responses to issues and events, they validate even more extreme and intemperate responses in their followers. James writes:

Not many of you should become teachers, my brothers and sisters, for you know that we who teach will be judged with greater strictness. For all of us make many mistakes. Anyone who makes no mistakes in speaking is perfect, able to keep the whole body in check with a bridle. If we put bits into the mouths of horses to make them obey us, we guide their whole bodies. Or look at ships: though they are so large that it takes strong winds to drive them, yet they are guided by a very small rudder wherever the will of the pilot directs. So also the tongue is a small member, yet it boasts of great exploits. How great a forest is set ablaze by a small fire! And the tongue is a fire. The tongue is placed among our members as a world of iniquity; it stains the whole body, sets on fire the cycle of nature, and is itself set on fire by hell. For every species of beast and bird, of reptile and sea creature, can be tamed and has been tamed by the human species, but no one can tame the tongue—a restless evil, full of deadly poison.

The incendiary power of the hasty word is dramatically increased in the age of social media. We should all be aware of the power of our tongues and our fingers on keyboards to spark huge conflagrations of consuming outrage. If we cannot exercise basic mastery over our words or our reactivity, we should shut down our blogs and quarantine ourselves from others on social media. This is doubly the case if we are in positions of leadership or influence: we will be judged with much greater strictness. If we cannot exercise control over our emotional reactions, we can be the cause of immense harm to the body of Christ and will have much to answer for on that last day.

Some persons make a virtue of the supposed ‘honesty’ of emotional ‘rawness’ in their leading voices. Passion, often expressed in hyperbolic outrage, is seen as ‘real’, ‘authentic’, and ‘heartfelt’. Raw, untamed, and vented emotional reaction is superior to the supposed artificiality of the controlled, channelled, and temperate response. Such persons are playing with fire.

3. Fault lines in Evangelicalism

World Vision’s policy change was an attempt to straddle the gap between conservative and progressive Christians and maintain a ‘big tent’ ministry. They wanted people from all sides to continue to identify with the organization and its values, values that can be shared by Christians on all sides of current debates surrounding homosexuality and same-sex marriage.

I have argued in the past that evangelicalism’s identity is largely rooted in the parachurch and its various sodalities. Without other overarching forms of denominational or institutional unity, evangelicalism finds much of its togetherness and shared identity in this area. On account of the importance of parachurch organizations for evangelicalism, evangelicals are very heavily invested in them and the unity and shared identity that they represent. Consequently, when an organization such as World Vision makes a policy change that jettisons their commitment to a core value of many evangelicals, they should expect very strong resistance and opposition. Organizations such as World Vision aren’t just functional means by which evangelicals help the needy but are symbolic of evangelicals’ shared identity.

The problem that evangelicalism now faces is that the fault lines between conservatives and progressives in its ranks have grown so wide—especially on issues such as same-sex marriage—that it is no longer so possible to represent both sides in a manner with which all will strongly identify. Organizations such as World Vision face the difficulty of producing policies that all parties will recognize as a representation of their core values despite deeply polarizing issues. This is almost impossible to do without one party or another feeling betrayed, that an unacceptable degree of compromise has taken place, or that the organization is no longer one with which they feel a deep identification.

All of this raises more general questions about the future of evangelicalism. I fear that the next few years will witness an increasingly acrimonious and protracted divorce between conservative and progressive evangelicals as the various parties bicker and squabble about the ownership of the dissolving union’s various institutional assets. If we were merely dealing with deep theological and ethical differences the problem would be bad enough. However, one only has to observe the reactivity, the antagonism and suspicion, the bitterness and absence of charity, the hurt and the lack of respect that exists between the sides of these debates to realize that the problems run much deeper.

4. Inability to Believe the Best

Reading through many of the posts and tweets written over the last few days, I have been repeatedly struck by an apparent inability or unwillingness of many to put charitable constructions upon the actions, words, and beliefs of those with whom they differ. As Derek Rishmawy observes, an overdependence upon a hermeneutic of suspicion is a dangerous thing. The hermeneutic of suspicion also stands in a very uneasy relationship with our Christian duty to believe the best of others when we can.

The use of vulnerable children as emotional leverage has been particularly unhealthy on both sides of this debate. I am not going to give any links here, but those who have followed this debate will be familiar with the suggestion among the critics of World Vision’s original decision that they were harming vulnerable children and the suggestion among its supporters that critics didn’t care about the vulnerable children. That such vicious and false accusations have been advanced among us should be a cause of deep shame.

5. Follow the Money?

A good example of the hermeneutic of suspicion in action has been the popular suggestion from both sides that, when World Vision made a decision of which they disapproved, the decision must have been driven by money. While such an interpretation of events should not simply be dismissed, it shouldn’t be the first interpretation to which we jump. I am not persuaded that either of World Vision’s decisions were driven purely or even primarily by financial concerns.

For instance, the cynical suggestion that World Vision’s reversal of its original decision was purely about the fear of losing money seems to assume that the relationship between a Christian charity and its supporters can be boiled down to dollars. The possibility that World Vision feels a sense of responsibility towards its supporters, supporters who made it the organization that it is today, isn’t really entertained. Sensing just how betrayed many of these supporters feel by this latest development, World Vision may have felt duty bound to reverse its decision, even apart from the financial hit that it would have taken. When you are acting in people’s name and in partnership with them, making such unilateral changes in core commitments can be an unchristian act of breaking faith with people who trust and support you. This doesn’t mean that such changes can’t be made, but they need to be made in the right way.

6. What is the Nature of Christian Charity?

A common argument among supporters of World Vision’s original decision is that, provided the poor are being helped, we should not really care that much about who the persons are who are doing it.

This argument represents a position on the proper character of charity, suggesting that charity is just about making material provision for those in need and that it can consequently be treated as secular action. This secular action can and will be motivated by core Christian values, but there is nothing intrinsically Christian about it. Governments can often treat Christian charity in such a manner: what makes charity Christian belongs chiefly to the realm of private motivations. However, the actual form of charity should ideally be secular and driven solely by material outcomes.

However, Christians do not typically believe that the works of mercy are essentially secular acts, but that the care and service of the poor is a crucial element of who we are as Christians, expressive of our identity in Christ, an act of worship and mission, and an essential ‘body function’ of the Church. Consequently, it is important to us to serve the poor through organizations that share, express, and are guided by core Christian commitments of faith and practice. Charity is not just about giving money to the needy, but bringing the presence of Christ to and being the presence of Christ in the places of pain in the world. The agencies through which we enact our charity are very important for this reason.

Christian charity is a matter of partnership in the gospel. Even if the money and resources provided to the recipient of charity are exactly the same, it matters a great deal whether that money is given through some secular NGO or through an organization that represents us as the body of Christ to those in need.

There is no reason why Christian charities can’t work alongside other charities of other religions or without religious commitments. A charity is not a church and a Christian charity may even benefit from employing non-Christians on occasions to perform specific roles, provided that their institutional agency is clearly a Christian one. However, employee policies that seek to uphold the Christian identity and agency of a charity are an important means by which identity is defined and maintained.

7. Why make such a big deal about homosexuality and same-sex marriage?

The stakes in the debates surrounding the legitimacy of homosexual relations and same-sex marriage are seldom truly appreciated. I’ve written more secular critiques of same-sex marriage on various occasions before, addressing the more general cultural debates. However, the explicitly Christian reasons for rejecting homosexual practice and same-sex marriage must be clearly grasped. These aren’t issues that can be treated as adiaphorous. There are a number of things at stake here.

The image of God is presented as male and female in Scripture, a fact which is reflected in marriage. Same-sex relations undermine this reality. They represent a distortion of and assault upon the image of God in mankind. As Romans 1 suggests, a distortion of the image of God is an act of idolatry, an act of false worship and false witness, and through such acts the human being is degraded. Within the symbolic world of Scripture, homosexual relations are a deep perversion, a crime against human nature, and an idolatrous act against God. This is why they are treated in such stark terms.

There is no reason why a perversion of human nature as created by God and an act of false and idolatrous image-bearing can’t be completely consensual. The Bible doesn’t subscribe to our modern prejudice that ethics more or less boil down to issues of consent and harm among human parties. Furthermore, the fact that many committed Christians hold to the legitimacy of same-sex relations and even practice them doesn’t mean that they can’t be that serious. It may mitigate the level of their guilt, but it does not diminish the seriousness of the sin. There were many pious Christians who were slave-owners in the American South, for instance. Their relationship to their slaves may have revealed many Christian virtues, which would be worthy of great praise if viewed in isolation. However, the fundamental relationship was founded upon an attack upon the image of God, one that many were incapable of seeing on account of a catastrophic moral blindness that afflicted the society more generally.

The notion that marrying mitigates the sin of homosexual relations, as World Vision’s changed policy might suggest, is also misguided. Same-sex marriage merely exalts acts that are presented by Scripture as idolatrous and places them on a par with the union that he created and blessed at the beginning. This parodying of marriage compounds the sin.

The Bible hardly says anything about homosexual acts, why should we make such a big deal about them? Homosexual acts and same-sex marriage strike at the heart of Christian sexual ethics, which have always been central in guiding and defining Christian practice. They also threaten our theological anthropology. Finally, contemporary arguments in favour of same-sex marriage and homosexual relations represent a crisis in our more general understanding of Scripture. For these reasons among others, we cannot budge, compromise, or split the difference on this issue.

8. Wasn’t World Vision just being neutral?

In its change in policy, World Vision was presenting this issue as adiaphorous. As Ian Paul writes:

But, as the old saying goes, not to decide is to decide. In deferring to the (conflicting) views of different denominations, Stearns is saying that this is a matter of adiaphora between churches. It is something on which we can agree to disagree. WV are perfectly entitled to say this, but I don’t think it is possible to present this as a lack of decision. It really is a decision on the status of the question—and that is the heart of the matter.

The difficulty with World Vision’s stance was that, to the extent that people hold a more traditional (and, I would argue, biblical) Christian position on homosexual relations similar to that outlined above, it will never be something that can be viewed as adiaphorous. To make such a change is to become a sort of organization with which conservative evangelicals can no longer so strongly identify.

If World Vision didn’t have such an employee policy in the first place, or if its employee policy didn’t place expectations regarding sexual behaviour upon its employees, this situation wouldn’t necessarily have arisen in the same manner. However, many of us might be less inclined to identify the organization that would result as a distinctively Christian one. This wouldn’t mean that we couldn’t support it, in much the same way as many of us—myself included—support various non-Christian charities, whose employee policies don’t give any significance to Christian ethical values.

Over to you. What are your thoughts?

Posted in Controversies, Ethics, On the web, Sex and Sexuality, The Blogosphere, Theological | 77 Comments

Remarks on New Testament Authorship

The Thirsty Gargoyle, whom I had the privilege of meeting in person last year, has some helpful remarks on the question of New Testament authorship. Take a look.

Posted in Apologetics, NT, NT Theology, The Blogosphere, Theological | 1 Comment

Is N.T. Wright in his Right-Mind?

N.T. Wright

Scot McKnight’s recent reference to it has reminded me of N.T. Wright’s treatment of right brain/left brain dichotomies in his treatment of readings of the Apostle Paul, especially as they relate to his use of the Old Testament. This isn’t the first time that Wright has made such claims, and I seem to recall him making similar references to the MBTI in the past.

As far as I am aware, Wright’s most detailed discussion of right and left brain thinking is found in his inaugural lecture at St Mary’s College in St Andrews: ‘Imagining the Kingdom: Mission and Theology in Early Christianity’. Here is an extended quotation:

One final element of our modern world which has militated against imagining the kingdom in our reading of the gospels, and much else besides, is the triumph of left-brain thinking over right-brain thinking.… [T]he apparently left-brain activities of analysing, calculating and organising have steadily taken charge of our world, squeezing out the apparently right-brain activities of imagination, story-telling, and intuitive thinking, I find it uncannily accurate as a description of our world in general and of biblical scholarship in particular.…

McGilchrist does not refer to the world of biblical scholarship, but the following paragraph jumped out at me as a pretty accurate summary of how the discipline has often gone:

‘We could expect’ (he writes) ‘that there would be a loss of the broader picture, and a substitution of a more narrowly focussed, restricted, but detailed, view of the world, making it perhaps difficult to maintain a coherent overview . . . This in turn would promote the substitution of information, and information gathering, for knowledge, which comes through experience . . . One would expect the left hemisphere to keep doing refining experiments on detail, at which it is exceedingly proficient, but to be correspondingly blind to what is not clear or certain, or cannot be brought into focus right in the middle of the visual field. In fact one would expect a sort of dismissive attitude to anything outside of its limited focus, because the right hemisphere’s take on the whole picture would simply not be available to it.’ (428f.)

…All too often the microscopic analysis of details, vital though it is in its place, has been made to seem an end in itself. ‘Objective facts’ are all the rage, and whether you’re a left-wing hunter of objectivity, determined to disprove the gospels, or a right-wing hunter of objectivity, determined to show that they are after all ‘factual’, you may still be missing the point and losing the plot. Facts are left-brain business; vital in their place, but only part of the whole…. Only when the detailed left-brain analysis can be relocated as the emissary to the right-wing intuition, with its rich world of metaphor, narrative and above all imagination, can the discipline become healthy again.

Wright revisits this theme in Chapter 15 of his immense Paul and the Faithfulness of God, claiming that right-brain thinking has been resurgent in recent years in New Testament theology, especially through the work of Richard Hays. He contends that such right-brain thinking is more alert to the narrative big picture, more attuned to ‘echoes’ within the text, and less inclined to the ‘proof-texting’ readings that are most clearly exemplified by such documents as the Westminster Confession of Faith.

I discussed a number of issues that have relevance to Wright’s claims within my recent post on the problems in many uses of personality typing. Wright is a theological hero of mine, but I have far-reaching issues with his position here. The following are a few more thoughts:

1. The right-brain/left-brain dichotomy is a myth. Much ink has been shed and many trees have died in to secure our freedom from such questionable pop psychology. Let us honour their sacrifice.

2. Tying theological positions so closely to personality type offers a subtle invitation to Bulverism. There is a dangerous temptation to attribute theological positions to the fact that they are held by ‘left-brain thinkers’, and by so doing to substitute for close theoretical engagement with them.

3. Reifying certain hermeneutical sensibilities and locating them in the brain is problematic. Brains don’t read texts: people read texts, and they do so in terms of such things as principles of language, society, and textual meaning. Dealing with reading in terms of neuroscience instead of these things is a product of a fundamental misunderstanding of the manner in which the act of reading operates and can easily function as a means to avoid dealing with texts and their readers on less compliant yet more appropriate terms. This is not to deny that neuroscience can occasionally shed light on dimensions of our reading practices and hermeneutics. However, the popularity of reductive neuroscience has great potential to lead us astray here. Understandings of texts seldom follow so straightforwardly from the psychologies of their readers.

4. I wonder whether Wright’s characterization of the field of New Testament studies is in danger of losing sight of the dialogical, conversational, and contextually responsive nature of such a discipline. Wright may often pursue his theological project in a more monological manner. However, most scholars are not committed to such a daunting and ambitious venture and regard themselves more as voices within a conversation. Judiciously speaking into an ongoing and contextual conversation is a rather different art from building a monological system of thought: one often cannot straightforwardly deduce the shape that the latter would take from merely attending to the former.

Certain theologians may be more inclined to focus on neglected details in response to ‘big picture’ types, but this doesn’t mean that such words that they speak into the conversation provide a clear picture of the broader edifice of their thought. Many of us move between big picture and fine detail with some regularity, very closely relate the two, and do so primarily in response to other people within a conversation and context. I would be very concerned if people started to regard my comments on this blog as definitive and comprehensive pronouncements and representations of my thought on various issues, for instance: they are more typically context-bound and responsive remarks in continuing conversations. When I focus on the fine details it may not be because I am a left-brain thinker, but may be because I think that, in their zeal to describe the forest, my interlocutors are forgetting that forests have trees. Mutatis mutandis when I focus on the ‘big picture’.

5. Like other popular dichotomies—Eastern/Western, Hebrew/Greek, foxes/hedgehogs, female/male, heart/head, feeling/thinking, etc., etc.—the right-brain/left-brain dichotomy is deeply seductive, yet holds immense obfuscating potential. Many of us love it when the world divides up neatly, but the reality is typically much more complicated and less congenial to our rhetorical excesses. In most of the examples given above, simple polarities or dichotomies are hard to maintain and the reality is considerably more complex. The dichotomies answer less to the actual reality than they do to our desire for easy categorization.

For instance, those who push the feeling/thinking polarity typically neglect how deeply intertwined thinking and feeling are. As I have argued on various occasions on this blog, it is imperative for effective thinking that we maintain a healthy emotional relationship with the issues that we are studying. Thought can easily become reactive rather than responsive and ossify into self-delusional rationalization where this does not take place. The thinking/feeling dichotomy also neglects the role played by such things as imagination and desire. Furthermore, as we rest so much on the category of ‘emotion’, we lose the capacity to provide a more finely textured account of our selves, one that might employ a wider palette of categories such as appetites, passions, sentiments, and affections and discourage such simplistic oppositions between feeling and thinking.

6. Following on from the previous point, Wright associates narrative closely with the ‘right brain’. Is the reality really that simple? ‘Narrative’ strikes me as a rather questionable agglomeration and reification of several different processes. Dealing with narrative requires a package of skills, skills which cannot simplistically be attributed to one side of the brain. The presence of some of these skills is no guarantee of one’s facility in others.

Narrative literacy requires the skills of condensation and exposition, the ability to express the ‘point’ of a story and to narrate a story in detail. This sort of literacy requires recognition of the subtle differences between narrative, story, and plot and the ability to handle each in their appropriate manner. It requires the ability to identify and employ genre, to handle referentiality, to process emotional components of speech and discourse, to employ and understand intonation and emphasis, to recognize structures, patterns, sequences, and chronological order, to construct sentences and coordinate their elements, to handle verbs, nouns, qualifiers, tenses, conjunctions, etc., etc. Some narrative skills are skills of writing, while others are skills of speech.

The skills required for story-telling are not necessarily the same as those required for story-processing or analysis. For instance, the sort of Greimassian structural analysis that Wright employs in the course of his work is a rather atypical means of handling narrative, requiring a set of skills that probably differ from those required for most story-telling and processing.

What is missing in the lateralizing accounts of such as Wright is appreciation of the necessary coordination between the two sides of the brain in processing and producing narrative and the array of skills required in developing adeptness with it. There is literature out there on this subject (for instance, here).

7. I have made this point on a number of occasions recently, but it is important that we never forget that biblical narrative has striking differences in form, content, and function from the sort of narratives with which we are more accustomed. Wright has a propensity to employ narrative as a generic category (in what some might regard as a characteristic tendency to miss the trees for the forest), failing to pay sufficient attention to the differences between what narrative means for us and what it meant for particular ancient societies (although he does pay some attention to this).

8. When handling narrative in Pauline theology, we are often operating at the level of the structural logic of a narrative. Paul’s letters are less of a narrative than they are a second-order discourse about a narrative. Is it really the case that recognizing and processing the logic of Pauline arguments about narrative requires that one be that closely attuned to narrative more generally? Alternatively, could it be that the reason why many Pauline scholars have underemphasized narrative has less to do with the fact that they are ‘left-brain’ thinkers than it does with the fact that the text in front of them doesn’t take a very pronounced narrative form and has too often been functioned in a degree of abstraction from the parts of the Scripture that do?

9. Wright closely associates ‘rationalism’ with left-brain thinking. However, aren’t such methods as Greimassian structural analysis prone to a sort of ‘right-brain’ rationalism? Isn’t ‘left-brain thinking’ often a force that arrests the rationalistic tendency of the ‘right brain’ to ‘procrusteanize’ everything into a tidy big picture or narrative? Wright’s own fondness for broad brush characterizations—‘Enlightenment’ being a classic example—and tidy stories—Jesus and Caesar, return from exile, five act drama, etc.—has the effect of effacing many salient and significant details that, if attended to, would yield greater, if somewhat chastened, insight. Is Wright’s extreme emphasis upon the category of ‘narrative’ for understanding the Scripture and his tendency to place an extreme accent upon the unity of this—in an exceptionally bare bones form—just another manifestation of this tendency?

10. The presence of a ‘proof-texting’ mentality is not always apparent on the surface of things, nor is the proof-texting mentality usually helpfully defined. The same people who decry the supposed proof-texting of many conservative Christians can regularly reference a text such as Galatians 3:28 or Matthew 7:1, while offering only minimal account of their meaning within their context. How this isn’t subject to the same strictures isn’t entirely clear.

The Westminster Confession of Faith, which is paradigmatic of the proof-texting mentality for Wright, wasn’t originally produced with proof-texts and only included them at the request of the House of Commons. As Wright should appreciate from his interactions with other Pauline scholars, one man’s ‘echoes’ or shorthand gestures towards more detailed exegetical arguments are another man’s ‘proof-texts’. It remains to be demonstrated that the ‘proof-texts’ of a text such as the Westminster Confession of Faith were designed to function as decontextualized facts, rather than as signposts to sites of contextually sensitive exegetical argumentation in support of a particular doctrinal claim. If the charity that Wright wants us to Paul in understanding his uses of the Scriptures were also extended to texts such as the Westminster Confession of Faith, our judgments upon them might be somewhat mollified.

Also, aren’t many proof-texters ‘big picture’ theological system-builders, for whom a profound intuition for wholes undergirds their use of biblical texts to form the logical scaffolding of these structures? The difference between such persons and the narrative-attuned types may be harder to locate than Wright suggests. It may have more to do with the degree to which narrative is perceived to function as the organizing principle of biblical theology than it does with some neurological bias towards it.

Finally, Wright’s tendency to attribute hermeneutical postures relatively tidily to brain lateralization doesn’t resonate with my own experience. My hermeneutical postures have evolved very significantly over time and I currently function quite naturally with a sort of hermeneutical approach to the text that felt entirely alien when I first encountered it. When I’ve taken brain lateralization tests before (out of curiosity, while not believing in their purported scientific basis), I’ve always come out as a relatively pronounced left-brained type. However, in many respects, I would go further than Wright himself in many of the things that he attributes to the right-brain.

I agree that we possess natural inclinations that affect the way that we approach certain endeavours. However, self-familiarity has taught me that these inclinations are nowhere near as determinative as many presume. Most of us have the capacity to develop a hermeneutical approach that is appropriate to its subject matter, even when it doesn’t come so naturally to us. Developing such a hermeneutical posture can be akin to learning a second language. Students of a second language can be alert to features of the language—to its distinctive elements, grammar, vocabulary, and logic—to which many native speakers may be oblivious. I believe that those of us whose hermeneutical posture has been consciously, mindfully, and deliberately developed, rather than merely passively assimilated or thoughtlessly assumed, are often in a much better position to appreciate the limitations and strengths of various approaches and the problems inherent in the modes of thinking and reading that come most naturally to us. Those who have never taken the effort to develop beyond their mental ‘mother tongue’ do not merely lack understanding of other ways of seeing the world, but will never truly understand the character of their own.

Posted in Bible, N.T. Wright, NT, NT Theology, The Blogosphere, Theological | 13 Comments

Stabbings in the Bible

"Ehud reached with his left hand, drew the sword from his right thigh and plunged it into the king’s belly."

“Ehud reached with his left hand, drew the sword from his right thigh and plunged it into the king’s belly.”

I have long been fascinated with biblical accounts of stabbing. As a young child, my two favourite Old Testament stories were 1 Samuel 5 (Dagon and the Ark of the Covenant) and Judges 3:12-30 (Ehud’s stabbing of King Eglon). Somewhat surprisingly, I turned out tolerably well (although opinions on this front differ).

Through a recent discussion about left-handedness in biblical literature on Twitter, I started reflecting on the parallels between the stabbing of Eglon and the stabbing of Amasa in 2 Samuel 20. After mentioning the thought on Twitter, it turned out that one of my Twitter friends, Graham Ware, had given the subject some attention in the past. He has since written a fascinating blog post on the subject. It is well worth a read, full of insightful observations. Here is one paragraph:

The word rendered “belly” in the NIV is an interesting choice. The word (chomesh) is a rarely used word which means “fifth”. Amasa was stabbed “in the fifth”. The KJV translates more literally, with an interpretive assumption “in the fifth [rib]”. So, not really in his belly, but higher up in the torso (Amasa’s death is quick, not needing further jabs, so perhaps into the lungs or heart). The translators of the NIV tell us that Amasa’s intestines spill out (v. 10, “entrails” in the NRSV). That is unlikely given the location of the blade if chomesh in fact refers to the ribs (thus, above the intestines). Instead, what comes out of Amasa is not the intestines themselves, but the contents of the intestines (sorry for the grossness, but at death, this typically happens. In this case, death is presumably instantaneous). Bodner has written an article relating other stabbings which use this same term, and all from 2 Samuel; Asahel (Joab and Abishai’s brother), stabbed by Abner in 2:23; Abner stabbed by Joab in retalliation in 3:27, and Ishbosheth is stabbed by two assassins “in the stomach” according the NIV of 4:6. These 4 stabbings use the same unusual term for the location of the blade, chomesh, thus linking them together. Three of the four involve the sons of Zeruiah (Joab, Abishai and Asahel) and three involve a member of Saul’s family (Abner, Saul’s cousin, and Ishbosheth, Saul’s son). Perhaps we can then speculate that the stabbing of Ishbosheth is perhaps somehow linked back to Joab? Whatever the case, there is definitely an affinity for precisely targeted stabbings.

You should read the whole thing.

Posted in 2 Samuel, Bible, Judges, OT, The Blogosphere | 3 Comments

How Our Reading Can Muzzle Scripture

Earlier today, Mere Orthodoxy posted a guest post of mine entitled ‘The Dangers of Appealing to Personality Types’. Within it, I engage with a recent piece by Morgan Guyton, ‘Why English Majors Make Lousy Fundamentalists’ (also crossposted on Jesus Creed). Highlighting Guyton’s dependence upon the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and the concepts of personality associated with it, I identify some of the dangers that can arise from the increasing popularity of such personality tests within certain Christian circles (since posting, I have been directed to this very helpful piece on the same subject).

Guyton’s argument identifies the ‘INFP’ and the ‘English major’, implicitly claiming the academic privilege and authority enjoyed by the latter for the peculiar sensibilities of the former. Within this post, I would like to interact with the substance of Guyton’s post, which builds upon this identification, more directly. Although the post itself appears to be hastily written, fairly unguarded and slapdash, and I ignored it when I first read it, it subsequently received a lot of appreciation and attention and was recommended by no less than Scot McKnight. While it might seem unfair to Guyton to expose his piece to such detailed analysis, it is on account of its popularity and the influence of the people who have recommended it that I think that it ought to be given some close critical attention. I can sympathize with Guyton’s frustration at being criticized in such detail, but given the hazard of virality that all bloggers face and the higher profile that it has gained since it was first posted, I believe that it is fair game. Although I will direct my criticisms at Guyton, the viewpoint that he expresses here is something with which many, including some leading figures among progressive evangelicals, seem to resonate and are prepared to associate themselves. They, along with Guyton, should be regarded as among the primary targets of this critique.

Guyton’s post lists seven ‘instincts that English majors bring to reading the Bible that make the fundamentalists gnash their teeth at us.’

1) Unsubtle communication is bad writing
The measure of how good a writer you are is the degree to which you are able to communicate with subtlety. If I know how a sentence is going to end before I’ve gotten there, then it’s a crappy, uncreative sentence. To be unsubtle and completely straightforward is to be a bad writer. An English major assumes that the way to get people to do things is not to give them pristine clear commands to follow, but to tell a story that moves their hearts and sways them to respond the way that you’re hoping they will. As an English major, I need for God to be an infinitely better poet than I am, which means that I’m going to be averse to any approach to interpreting the Bible that camps out at a sixth grade level of reading comprehension and assumes God to be straightforward and perfectly clear when he seems to do a far better job of inspiring people with a little subtlety.

I must confess that a measure of surprise attended my reading of this paragraph. My surprise relates to the rather strong view of divine inspiration that would seem to be assumed within it at various points. Progressive evangelicals tend to talk a great deal about the accommodation of divine revelation to the culture of the day and its lower moral standards. However, it is interesting to see that, while progressives may believe that God accommodated his revelation to the brutal practice of slavery and to a misogynistic and patriarchal society, he would draw the line at accommodating it to bad poetry.

‘To be unsubtle and completely straightforward is to be a bad writer.’ Codswallop. A good writer will be able to communicate his thoughts both subtly and directly, as the occasion demands. As George Orwell appreciated, the inability to be completely straightforward in our language can be a threat to the health of society. Scripture holds a wealth of unsubtle speech and clear commands. Even though these are often organized and expressed with considerable literary art, their forthrightness is not diminished. We should also not forget that the appeal of a scripture that avoids being direct and unsubtle can be great for those who desire as much hermeneutical autonomy as possible for themselves in the understanding and application of its teachings.

It is the implicit idolatry in Guyton’s argument that most concerns me (‘As an English major, I need for God to be…’). Rather than allowing God to be God and seeking to come to terms with God’s revelation as it actually is, he appears to be approaching it with the demand that it fulfil his expectations of what revelation should actually look like. He seems to forget that one aspect of the scandal of divine revelation—one recognized by such as Augustine—is that it does not come to us in the form of great literature. The gods of the pagans inspired better poetry.

2) Narrators are supposed to have agendas
Stories in which you can completely trust the narrator and/or the protagonist are uninteresting and unrealistic. In so many Joyce Carol Oates novels that I’ve read, the narrator has issues that slant how the story is told and thus become a part of the story themselves. So as an English major, when I read the gospel of Luke, I’m going to be tuned into the way that Luke has crafted his story of Jesus as a narrator. How is Luke’s agenda different than Matthew’s when he tells the same stories but puts different words into Jesus’ mouth? What can we speculate about the community that Luke is writing for that differs from the community Matthew is writing for? For fundamentalists, it’s a scandalous betrayal of the text to say that the gospel writers had any kind of agenda other than dispassionately dictating whatever the proverbial angel whispered in their ears for them to copy down. For an English major, that’s just dull writing.

Guyton’s application of the criterion of ‘interestingness’ to scriptural interpretation derives little justification from the text itself, but is an expectation—nay, a demand!—brought to the text from someone in the supposedly privileged position of an ‘English major’. One wonders how the biblical text could survive this criterion if it were applied with any consistency. Are the opening chapters of 1 Chronicles ‘interesting’ writing? Even now, after a billion Bible-reading plans have foundered on the rocks of Leviticus, are we still holding onto the notion that the Bible will be interesting to the modern reader?

However, the most troubling aspect of this point is Guyton’s conflation of ‘interesting’ and ‘realistic’ stories in which narrators are not neutral but have a purpose and commitment with stories in which we cannot ‘completely trust the narrator and/or the protagonist.’ The notion that we cannot completely trust either the narrator or the protagonist of a text such as the Gospel of John stands in a very uneasy relationship with John 20:30-31 and 21:24-25.

I suspect that if Guyton asked around, he might be surprised to discover that many ‘fundamentalists’ are quite happy with the idea that the gospel writers were inspired and committed faithful witnesses, rather than dispassionate and robotic amanuenses of divine dictation. Fundamentalists can be unfashionable and are popular whipping boys. It should not escape us, however, that for many, including I suspect Guyton, it is a category inclusive of conservative evangelicals. On many of the fronts that Guyton is speaking, I am very proud to be counted among the fundamentalists.

The gospel writers undoubtedly craft their narratives differently and have motives that shape their telling of their accounts, but this doesn’t make them unreliable.

3) It’s all about the metaphors
To an English major, what makes a piece of writing rich and poetic are the metaphors it employs. Metaphors are scary things to fundamentalists because they seem like a ploy to undermine the Bible’s authority. To make Genesis 1 literal isn’t just a problem for me because of its contradiction of modern science. It’s a problem because there are so many cool things that the firmament, the waters above, and waters below could stand for metaphorically if they don’t have to be literal scientific facts (take a look at what Augustine does with them in his books 11-13 of his Confessions). When the Bible is “nothing but the facts,” then it’s been robbed of a critically important layer of its beauty. The early church fathers had a very different interpretation of 2 Timothy 3:16 than we do today. When they read that “all scripture is God-breathed and useful for teaching,” they took that to mean that every detail was pregnant with metaphorical content; nothing was mere historical backdrop. For example, Augustine interpreted the six jars of water that Jesus turned into wine in John 2:6 as the six ages of the world.

The first thing that we must be mindful to in such areas is the distinction between the question of the reality, or the concreteness or abstractness, of the extratextual referents of the text and the question of the text’s modes of referentiality (whether literal, metaphorical, or otherwise). The laudable focus upon intratextual and literary or narrative meaning in such movements as postliberalism has often been pursued at the expense of extratextual referentiality. Guyton’s celebration of metaphor fails to give any sort of an adequate account of extratextual referentiality. While it is healthy to recognize the narrative form of the text as constitutive of its truthful witness and not to seek to get ‘behind’ it, it is equally important that we do justice to the fact that, for the text to be a truthful witness, there has to be extratextual referentiality.

Guyton’s remarks also miss the fact that a literal narrative account is quite capable of employing symbolism. I suspect that this failure is partially attributable to his employment of the literal/metaphorical distinction, which tends to exclude the possibility of something being both at the same time. However, a narrative that refers literally is quite capable of being symbolic. By accentuating certain details of events, couching a narrative in certain terms, or highlighting certain patterns, it is possible to reveal symbolic dimensions in narratives that are nonetheless literal. Guyton’s apparent assumption that symbolic meaning in a text can only be recognized where literal referentiality is denied is a rather sophomoric one.

For instance, when Acts 2 describes three thousand people being ‘cut to the heart’ (vv.37, 41), we should probably recognize a symbolic relationship between this event and the events at Sinai in Exodus (cf. Exodus 32:25-29). Identifying this typological connection need not entail any denial of the historical fact of about three thousand people being saved, even though the latter fact is seen to reveal considerably more meaning than one might expect from a bare historical fact.

I wonder whether, if Guyton were better acquainted with the actual writing of fundamentalists, he might be surprised to discover that many of them read the Bible in a manner that perceives great symbolic meaning within all sorts of details that they nonetheless regard as literal references to historical facts (I would love to introduce him to some of my Brethren friends). If he were to study the hermeneutic of the earlier Church Fathers more closely, he might also discover that, in their approach to Scripture, they often have rather more in common with the fundamentalists than he might want to believe: they both recognize the presence of both figurative and literal meanings of the text, but don’t presume that they need to be placed at odds.

The category of ‘metaphor’ is also a problematic one when used in reference to early Church readings. As several scholars have observed (Henri de Lubac, Andrew Louth, Brevard Childs, and a number of others have all written upon this helpfully from various angles), the ‘allegorical’ readings of the Scriptures advanced by such as Origen were driven, not by general literary or hermeneutical theories—as Guyton’s remarks might suggest—but by Christian theological convictions. For instance, as Brevard Childs writes of Origen:

Origen was committed to an understanding shared by the New Testament, the Church Fathers, and the church tradition that preceded him that the sacred biblical text was the vehicle for God’s continual revelation. The text, in all its multidimensional shape, both literal and spiritual, pointed beyond itself to its substance, which was a spiritual reality. Young emphasizes … that the multiple meanings in Origen are really multiple referents. As a result, Origen’s exegetical practice is understood not by contrasting literal and figurative senses, but in his application of cross-referencing within scripture.

Guyton misunderstands the theological impetus of patristic allegory—I would be interested to know whether he has devoted serious study to the matter—when he frames it in terms of a literary preference for metaphor.

4) We make analogies
This overlaps somewhat with #3. When you’re an English major, you’re always making analogies between different books that you’ve read. For instance, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov is about the three brothers Dmitri, Ivan, and Alyosha, while Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina likewise includes three brothers Konstantin, Nicolai, and Sergius. So every time I read a story about three siblings, I always have these two great Russian novels in the back of my mind. In reading the Bible, I instinctively look for elements that might be analogies. In the New Testament, there are three major controversies that become important analogies for me in Biblical interpretation: Jesus’ Sabbath healing, the circumcision of the Gentiles, and eating ceremonially unclean foods. For fundamentalist Bible readers, these controversies are isolated incidents that have no bearing on how the church should handle analogous problems today. But an English major like me is going to draw an analogy between how these three issues were handled by Jesus and Paul and how the church should handle issues today including today’s controversy of all controversies, which I’m sure I don’t have to name.

Guyton speaks of drawing analogies as if it were some unique preserve of the English student, or some new wisdom that has suddenly dawned upon the Christian Church. However, many fundamentalist Christians are past masters in recognizing scriptural analogies. Figural and typological readings of Scripture have been going on pretty much uninterrupted for thousands of years. Readers of the scriptures have recognized themselves, their communities, and their circumstances being addressed analogically from within the text. Reading Guyton’s remarks, I begin to wonder whether they are primarily indicative of his limited exposure to conversations that have been occurring for centuries in his absence, leading to the presumption that he is the bearer of an insight that hasn’t occurred to many fundamentalists long before he came along.

The key difference between the fundamentalists and Guyton is not found in the belief that Scripture addresses our world analogically—a conviction that many fundamentalists hold far more firmly than Guyton would—but in the fundamentalists’ rejection of the particular analogies that Guyton draws. Jesus’ Sabbath healings, the circumcision of the Gentiles, and the eating of unclean foods have all received considerable attention in conservative Christian circles and are hardly treated as isolated historical incidences without contemporary relevance.

The fact that we should be drawing analogies between biblical accounts and the contemporary Church does not mean that every analogy that presents itself is a good one, nor that we have considerable free to draw analogies without a number of scriptural controls. Fundamentalists’ disagreement with Guyton’s assumption that the analogies that he draws from these texts settle key questions of the Church’s response to the LGBT community does not arise from a failure to understand the general appropriateness of drawing analogies from such texts, but from a conviction that the particular analogies that Guyton draws are illegitimate and that they cannot survive rigorous testing in light of a fuller theological and figural reading of the scriptures. This is not the place to engage in a detailed counter-reading of the issues that Guyton raises, but such a reading could easily be presented.

5) We expect characters to be complicated
English majors have read lots of novels. What makes a novel elegant is how it develops its characters. Good literary characters are never purely good guys or bad guys. They are always complicated. So when I read the Bible and I see a character like Abraham, I see a complicated figure, not the model of perfect faithfulness, no matter what Paul and the author of Hebrews say about him. Abraham pimped out his wife twice to avoid getting killed. He refused to stand up to Sarah when she bullied Hagar and Ishmael. He was ready to murder his son Isaac, because a voice in his head that said it was God told him to do so. Because I’m an English major, I talk back to Abraham and every other character in the Bible, including Mr. Infallibility himself, the apostle Paul. When I read Paul’s letters, I hear his humanity come out. Sometimes I sympathize with him; sometimes I don’t. While I appreciate Paul’s zeal and his deeper vision, I’m not sure I would do everything he told me to do if I were alive then because he can really be an arrogant jerk sometimes. A fundamentalist doesn’t recognize Paul to have a character as such because Paul is simply a mouthpiece of God.

At this point I should raise one of my greatest concerns with Guyton’s approach. Guyton consistently imposes the expectations and prejudices of a modern Western literary reader onto ancient texts. The unsophistication of his assumption that the biblical text should conform to the patterns of the modern novel baffles me. Those who impose the expectations of modern historiography upon the text of Scripture are often and rightly challenged. However, Guyton seems to go a step further, imposing expectations appropriate to modern literary fiction upon an ancient historical narrative. If the former approach is rightly regarded as a domestication and distortion of biblical meaning, how much more the approach that Guyton is advocating? Surely a student of literature should be alert to matters of literary genre and to the ways in which ancient historiography might radically defy the expectations of someone accustomed to modern novels. Furthermore, if Guyton were to talk to students of ancient history or literature, he may discover that the habits of reading that they learnt differ markedly from those of his own training.

This cuts to the heart of this fifth point of Guyton’s. So much of the chatter about ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ in Christian circles today proceeds in a manner largely oblivious to the particular form that these things take within the scriptures themselves. What we mean by ‘story’ and ‘narrative’ is some way removed from the character that they have in the Bible, yet their presence in the Bible is used to justify the cavalier uses to which we put these categories. Guyton’s point about characterization is a great example of an instance where the expectations of the modern reader are confounded by the reality of the biblical text. I remarked in a recent post:

The fact that scriptural narrative, in contrast to much preaching upon it, is not typically focused upon the subjective states, inner lives, and autonomous identities of its protagonists is seldom properly recognized. While Scripture speaks of many particular persons, it does not share the type of emphasis that our culture places upon individuality and personal narratives. Where we have elevated ‘personality’, often to the neglect of ‘character’, Scripture presents us with limited clues to the ‘personalities’ of its characters and seems to have little interest in the matter. In God’s eternal wisdom, he did not choose to reveal Jesus’ MBTI personality type.

In Scripture, individuals find much of their significance within the larger stories to which they contribute and in terms of the typological roles that they perform. Biblical characters are pretty ‘flat’, rather than possessing the ‘rich internal life’ that the self-reflection encouraged by such things as widespread diary-writing and the modern novel has accustomed us to. First person autobiographical narratives are not the norm. Rather, biblical narrative situates people within a story that is not their own and speaks of them from a third person perspective that clearly relativizes their self-accounts.

Where Guyton’s training in the reading of modern literature has misled him, causing him to focus upon the complexity of characters in their individual personalities, I would suggest that the biblical narrative is rather focused upon the richness of figural meaning in the lives of its protagonists, upon the ways that their lives reveal larger developing patterns of divine action. For a detailed study of how this plays out in the particular stories that Guyton raises, I would direct you to my treatment of these passages in my yet to be completed 40 Days of Exoduses series.

Guyton’s remarks about the Apostle Paul also need to be challenged. Many fundamentalists would be rather surprised to discover that they don’t believe that Paul has a character because he is a mouthpiece of God. As with literal and symbolic meaning, it just never occurred to them to regard the two things to be at odds with each other. Fundamentalists hear the humanity of Paul in his letters too and often preach upon it (has Guyton ever listened to a fundamentalist sermon on Philemon, 2 Corinthians 12, 2 Timothy 4, Philippians 1, or other such passages?). They just believe, beyond the ideological straitjacket of much modernity, that Paul could be both fully human and a divinely-inspired writer of Holy Scripture. Also, the fact that he was inspired in his writing of his canonical epistles and that they are regarded as infallible doesn’t mean that Paul himself was regarded as infallible.

6) Poetry trumps grammar and history
The default fundamentalist way of interpreting the Bible is grammatical-historical. What matters to the fundamentalists is how the words in the Bible were used in the time-period when they were written. That’s the only meaning they are allowed to have. In contrast, an English major notices all the interesting poetic quirks about the words, which are allowed to influence their meanings. So for instance, the fact that the Greek word for church, ekklesia, is the word used in the Septuagint for Hebrew religious gatherings and the word used in pagan society for public political assemblies doesn’t make its meaning reducible to “religious gathering” for me. When I see ekklesia, I see a compound noun combining ek (out) and klesia (calling). So ekklesia to me will always be about God’s calling us out of the world and into a new reality instead of being merely a “religious gathering,” because I see the word with a poet’s eyes.

The restriction of biblical meaning to the grammatical-historical may be true in the case of many fundamentalists, but it is hardly a universally held position, as many fundamentalists have given great significance to figural readings of texts. More particularly, however, the opposition that Guyton establishes between grammatical-historical understandings of the meaning of words and texts and literary and poetic understandings seems to arise in large measure from an ignorance of what grammatical-historical readings actually involve and the impression that they somehow exclude the poetic and literary dimensions of texts’ meaning. Isn’t a ‘grammatical’ understanding of texts able to include poetry?

The reason why grammatical-historical exegetes would generally take issue with the claim that Guyton makes in the particular case of the word ekklesia is not on account of a dullness to the poetic and allusive character of words and texts. Rather, they would firmly reject his interpretation on account of their greater sensitivity to the specific forms that this takes and to the unanticipated dangers and fallacies that lie in the path of careless and undisciplined novices in these areas. One is tempted to suggest a reading of James Barr’s fifty plus page treatment of etymological fallacies in his Semantics of Biblical Language. Guyton might then be able to provide a more nuanced defence of his position, one more alert to the need to address the many counter-arguments that have been raised by seasoned scholars who have considered this etymology. However, at the moment, he seems entirely innocent of knowledge of this wider debate. While Greek scholars might accord Guyton a measure of poetic licence within a homiletical context to engage in felicitous wordplay, most would be swift to point out the deeply flawed nature of his etymology.

Readings of Scripture that are alert to poetry and symbolism are not news to conservative or fundamentalist Christians. I would suggest that Guyton take the opportunity to acquaint himself with the work of Peter Leithart or James Jordan, for instance. He might be encouraged to discover that many conservative and fundamentalist Christians share his appreciation for the poetic potential of language.

The issue here isn’t really poetic sensitivity, however, but the use of an undisciplined appeal to poetic licence to end-run the ostensive meaning of biblical texts—‘poetry trumps grammar and history.’ By playing poetic sensitivity off against grammar and history, it is weakened, not strengthened. A deeper poetic sensitivity can be found as we attend to the ways in which words operate within their immediate and wider historical and textual contexts and within semantic systems. As we do this, we may realize that not every potential allusion or poetic connection has the sort of immediacy, relevance, or legitimacy that we might presume. One could imagine the etymology for ekklesia that Guyton presents having relevance within a context where it was being highlighted by means of wordplay (much as one imagine a poetic use of many English terms that would explore forgotten etymologies, verbal resemblances, and dead meanings—the Bible is quite prepared to do this sort of thing itself on occasions). However, Guyton’s more general claim about the meaning of the term cannot be supported.

Once again, it is the appeal to a modern poetic sensibility, unchastened by close attention to the text, as if that granted privileged access to biblical meaning that is the problem here. A dilettante’s romantic enthusiasm about poetic readings can also substitute for the actual work of careful reading, which is far less appealing. Against the volume of encomia to the poetic and romantic character of the biblical text, the quantity of detailed and careful exegesis produced can appear rather slight and of very uneven quality. This is the biblical exegesis of the ‘pub expert’ or the ‘fanboy’.

Guyton’s piece came to mind when I reread Kevin Dettmar’s scintillating critique of Dead Poets Society this morning. Dettmar describes the amateur’s approach to the humanities, the approach of the fan rather than the critic:

If Wordsworth and the Romantics sometimes argue for an anti-intellectual (or merely non-intellectual) relationship to nature, they never offer this as a theory of reading, as Keating consistently does.

But many people like misreading “The Tables Turned,” and like their poetry, as the Car Talk guys would say, “unencumbered by the thought process.” There’s a reason there’s no Dead Novelists Society: for poetry, in the public imaginary, is the realm of feeling rather than thinking, and the very epitome of humanistic study. To understand how preposterous and offensive this stipulation is, turn it around. Imagine what would happen if we suddenly insisted that physics professors were ruining the beauty and mystery and wonder of the natural world by forcing students memorize equations. Or if we demanded that the politics department stop teaching courses in political theory.

Guyton’s romantic and anti-intellectual vision of poetic reading has some uncomfortable similarities to this. One of the greatest dangers of such a posture is that the text is prevented from resisting its reader. Such ‘poetic’ reading, which ignores the unwelcome work of the hard-nosed critic, risks rendering the text a screen upon which we project our own prejudices. Dettmar observes:

For Keating—and one fears, examining the scant evidence the film provides, for his students—every poem is a Song of Myself. This, then, is what’s at stake in Keating’s misreadings—I’m not interested simply in catching a fictional teacher out in an error. But he misreads both Frost and Whitman in such a way that he avoids precisely that encounter with the other, finding in poetry only an echo of what he already knows—what he’s oft thought, but ne’er so well expressed.

Such ‘poetic’ reading can easily dull the scandal that the text presents to us with romantic wishful thinking.

7) Every text has multiple voices
When you study novels in college, you’re trained that it’s a fallacious enterprise to try to determine the author’s single, unequivocal “intended meaning” for a text. What’s more interesting are all the rebellious dissenting voices within a text. I will never forget getting into a fierce debate in class over the Brothers Karamazov. There’s a character named Smerdyakov, the illegitimate son of Fyodor Karamazov, whom the narrator describes with pure contempt. It seems like the author Dostoevsky really wants for the reader to hate Smerdyakov, but he’s so nasty to him that the text rebels against its author and quivers with outrage at Smerdyakov’s treatment. I see the Old Testament quiver in a similar way when God strikes Uzzah dead for touching the Ark of the Covenant in 2 Samuel 6. Since God is a much more complicated, brilliant author than any of us could be, it’s hard for me to believe that God doesn’t anticipate the sympathy that readers will show for the declared “bad guys” in his text and that this sympathy isn’t part of his calculated purpose in telling the story the way he does. To respond to the Bible without a heart seems like a greater crime against God’s purpose than to protest whenever the Bible shows God doing something that doesn’t jibe with Jesus’ character. How do we know that God isn’t baiting us into protest? Does God really have to be as unsophisticated as his most simple-minded readers? I happen to think that he’s a real trickster just like Jesus is when he refuses to answer any question in a straightforward way.

Once again, Guyton imposes the expectations of a reader of modern fiction upon the biblical text. The applicability and appropriateness of literary theory of fairly recent vintage and limited cultural provenance to the reading of the scriptural texts is assumed, rather than argued. A ragbag of concepts of literary theory—Bakhtinian ‘polyphony’, deconstruction, reader-response criticism, and feminist literary criticism—seem to provide the basis for Guyton’s largely a priori claim that Scripture invites such readings.

What is altogether lacking here is any account of Scripture’s sui generis character. There is no indication of extensive reflection upon the concept of canon, for instance, and the way that this ought to frame our reception of the various voices and narratives within it, both of the characters of its stories and the biblical authors themselves. Deconstructive readings of biblical texts are undoubtedly possible. However, to what extent are such readings consistent with the canonical form within which such texts are presented to us? Are they consonant with the Scriptures own reading of themselves? Does the biblical text also ‘rebel against its author’?

Conclusion

A subtle yet persistent underlying theme in Guyton’s argument concerns his unassailable prerogatives as an interpreter over against a biblical text largely shorn of its authority. It begins with the implied suggestion that the mere possession of a particular personality type grants him some sort of privileged insight into the way that the Scripture ought to be read, something that can be employed to dismiss many who would challenge him (‘he is an ISTP, of course he wouldn’t understand!’). Much of the rest of his argument then proceeds on the basis of the assumption that God must conform to the naturally enlightened expectations of a contemporary English major. Once again, the foundation is now laid for lightly disregarding those without such a background.

Now that Guyton has asserted his natural entitlement and privilege as a reader, much of the rest of his case proceeds by limiting the claims that the text might make upon him. God’s word shouldn’t be ‘unsubtle and completely straightforward’, nor should it involve ‘clear commands’. ‘As an English major,’ Guyton needs God to conform to his privileged and enlightened expectations and, significantly, to communicate in a fashion that affords him maximal interpretative latitude.

The expectation that we should trust the biblical text is also problematic and restrictive of interpretative autonomy. Trustworthy narrators are just so dull. And who could think of a worse fate than for God to fail the Wildean test, turning out to be tedious, rather than charming? Consequently, we ought to appeal to the committed character of the biblical writers as a basis for a (relatively soft-pedalled) hermeneutic of suspicion.

Metaphor is to be celebrated, especially as it allows the interpreter to think of all of the ‘cool things’ that the text could stand for metaphorically if it didn’t have to be constrained by the dull and prosaic limitations of literal meaning. All the better if these metaphorical meanings are not regarded as subject to clear scriptural controls. The ability to draw analogies has great advantages. When we have already granted ourselves so much wriggle-room with regard to determining the meaning of the text, the fact that we can use our poetic and interpretative licence to draw analogies that invoke divine authority for our pet causes in the current day is akin to being written a blank cheque.

From the enlightened position of an English major, a person can recognize that God must make the writers and characters of Scripture complex characters to which we are supposed to talk back and only occasionally sympathize with. (For what sort of a god would fail to meet the expectations of an English major?) In giving us the Scriptures, God subjects it to the sovereignty of our personal and moral sensibilities, allowing us to cast judgment upon the worth of its contents and characters accordingly. Possessing the privileged insight of a ‘poet’s eyes’ such a reader can ‘trump grammar and history’ and read texts on a higher plane.

The fact that the biblical text must have multiple and ‘dissenting’ voices entitles us to forge our textual allegiances however we see fit. God is obviously a ‘trickster’, who wouldn’t be so ‘unsophisticated’ as to communicate with us ‘in a straightforward way’, in a way that might be understood by—shudder!—his ‘most simple-minded readers.’ Recognizing this, we are freed to read the biblical text against itself, to deconstruct it, to read against the ‘actantial grain’. Such a text does not really tie us down to any particular reading (such an approach often appeals to radical ‘interpretative pluralism’ as evidence, thereby imputing many of the failures of the text’s interpreter’s to the text itself). It is important to observe that many of the celebrations of the scriptural reader’s questioning that one often encounters in progressive Christian circles today fail to recognize within the text much of an authority and power to question us back.

In a post that has received a fairly positive response in progressive evangelical circles, Guyton has presented us with a deeply problematic account of biblical interpretation. The ‘English major’, brimming with natural entitlement and privilege, is granted an immense hermeneutical freedom. The text gives him the right to employ it to underwrite his moral prejudices, yet it is muzzled in all of the respects in which it might otherwise be permitted to challenge him.

I believe in the Christological character of Scripture. God has permitted his Word to be delivered into the hands of men, often in order to be crucified in weakness. Nevertheless, this same Word lives by the power of God and, despite all of the violence of our literary theories and reading practices, will prove the final Word, calling every one of its readers to account, testing the thoughts and the intents of their hearts. God does not need us to defend his Word. However, as those who interpret it we often need to be reminded of its authority over us and of the subtle and sophisticated ways in which we can undermine this. Let us pray that we learn to love, trust, and obey God’s Word, and that we receive it with a godly fear.

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